Engelhardt on the Common Morality in Bioethics by Iltis, Ana S.
   
   
Conatus
Vol. 3, 2018
 
  
  Engelhardt on the Common Morality in Bioethics
Iltis Ana Wake Forest University
https://doi.org/10.12681/conatus.19284
 
  Copyright © 2018 Ana S. Iltis 
   
  
   
To cite this article:
Iltis, A. (2018). Engelhardt on the Common Morality in Bioethics. Conatus, 3(2), 49-59.
doi:https://doi.org/10.12681/conatus.19284
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 20/02/2020 23:22:02 |
Contemporary Bioethics is, at least in part, the product of biomedical and sociopolitical changes in the middle to latter part of the 20th century. While its history has been described differently and some elements are hotly 
contested, a number of events and developments were important in the emergence 
of Bioethics.1 These include the advent of organ transplantation and the interest in 
(re)defining death, the introduction of life-saving or life-extending but scarce medical 
resources such as dialysis, the ability to keep patients who otherwise would have died 
alive in intensive care units even when there appeared to be no prospect of recovery, 
the legalization of abortion in the United States, and public revelation of the United 
1 See Albert Jonsen, The Birth of Bioethics (New York: Oxford University Press1998); Tina Ste-
vens, Bioethics in America: Origins and Cultural Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2000); John Evans, The History and Future of Bioethics: A Sociological View (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2012); Robert Baker, Before Bioethics: A History of American Medi-
cal Ethics from the Colonial Period to the Bioethics Revolution (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2013); David Rothman, Strangers at the Bedside (New Brunswick, NJ: Aldine Transaction, 
1991).
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Abstract
Contemporary Bioethics is, at least in part, the product of biomedical and sociopolitical 
changes in the middle to latter part of the 20th century. These changes prompted reflection 
on deep moral questions at a time when traditional sources of moral guidance no longer 
were widely respected and, in some cases, were being rejected. In light of this, scholars, 
policy makers, and clinicians sought to identify a common morality that could be used 
among persons with different moral commitments to resolve disputes and guide clinical 
practice and health policy. The concept of the common morality remains important in 
Bioethics. This essay considers the common morality in light of the work of H. Tristram 
Engelhardt, Jr. 
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States Public Health Service study of untreated syphilis in poor African-American 
men in Tuskegee, Alabama. These events and practices prompted reflection on deep 
moral questions at a time when traditional sources of moral guidance no longer 
were widely respected and in some cases were being rejected. Many were suspicious 
of authority figures, including physicians and religious leaders, or at best they saw 
them as irrelevant. The sociopolitical trend of challenging and rejecting authority 
and traditional sources of moral guidance together with biomedical developments 
that generated new questions created space for others to engage issues and direct 
future decisions. 
A major theme early in Bioethics (and one that continues today) is the question of 
who is in authority to make health care decisions. Substantive issues beyond matters 
of authority included questions about the permissibility of various types of research, 
whether and when it was permissible to withhold or withdraw medical treatment, and 
how to allocate scarce resources. These were not merely academic questions to be 
discussed endlessly. These questions were arising in real life situations and demanded 
action-guiding answers. While some of these matters seemed intensely private, there 
was a sense that they were in fact community or public affairs. The state was involved 
in funding research, defining death, and paying for dialysis and other health care, for 
instance. Cases were being heard before courts in the United States and the state was 
deciding whether or not single women should be permitted to access birth control 
[Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)], ventilators could be withdrawn 
[In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (NJ 1976)], and, later, whether artificial 
nutrition and hydration could be withheld [Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department 
of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)]. There was a push for communal reflection and 
decision making. It was in this context that Bioethics flourished and that a desire to 
identify neutral, secular, shared grounds for bioethical decision-making took root. 
Numerous figures shaped Bioethics as it developed. One of them was H. Tristram 
Engelhardt, Jr. (1941-2018). As a young philosopher, he wrote:
“Ethics, as a philosophical enterprise, is best conceived as an attempt to 
negotiate diverse moral intuitions. Ethics is the logic of a pluralism in the 
sense that ethics is an attempt to find the most general grounds or bases for 
judging the rightness and wrongness of conduct. Unlike religious ethics, or 
particular legal traditions, philosophical ethics hopes for general principles 
of conduct discoverable by disinterested reflection, apart from either grace 
or cultural prejudice. Though such a disinterested perspective cannot be 
attained, one can move towards such a vantage point by attempting to lay 
out ever more clearly general principles of moral conduct.”2 
2 Tristram Engelhardt,  In  National Commission  for the Protection of Human Subjects of 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Appendix I, Essay 8, 4, 63, 1978.
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These principles would be neutral in the sense that they would “not [be] engaged 
on either side; specifically: not aligned with a political or ideological grouping” 
(Merriam Webster). They would be secular in that they would not be “overtly or 
specifically religious” (Merriam Webster). These features would allow persons who 
held different or no religious convictions as well as different accounts of the good 
life to share and use the principles to answer moral questions and resolve disputes 
despite their differences. 
Early on, Engelhardt recognized the deep problems associated with pursuing 
common ethical principles as he had described them, principles that allegedly would 
allow for moral reflection and decision making despite the loss of foundational 
sources of morality and in the face of moral disagreement. He dedicated much of 
his work to demonstrating that the claim to have discovered a common morality 
that could be used to guide Bioethics was a deception that would be used to harness 
authority and exert power.3 Much of his later work was dedicated to two other 
important ends, which are not the focus of this essay. The first was articulating one 
particular account of biomedical morality, that of the Orthodox Christian Church.4 
The second was exploring the consequences of living in a world governed by secular 
ideology.5 In such a world, Engelhardt argues, the state has become not secular 
but secularist, meaning that it “seeks to exclude from the public forum and even 
from public discourse any but a secular ideology.”6 Here, we consider the common 
morality in light of Engelhardt’s assessment of it.
Bioethics and the Hope for the Common Morality 
When persons who did not share an account of moral authority or guidance faced 
urgent questions about health care and biomedical research, an action-guiding morality 
shared by all was sought. It would have to arise not from religious commitments or 
other particular views of the good life but from a neutral, secular foundation that 
could be recognized and applied by and to all persons. This was especially important 
for the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical 
and Behavioral Research, which had been tasked with identifying the principles that 
could govern human research in the wake of revelations of the United States Public 
Health Service study of untreated syphilis. The National Commission went about 
3 See Tristram Engelhardt, Bioethics and Secular Humanism (London: SCM Press and Philadel-
phia: Trinity Press International, 1991), and Tristram Engelhardt, The Foundations of Bioethics 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
4 See Tristram Engelhardt, The Foundations of Christian Bioethics (Salem: Taylor & Francis, 
2000).
5 See Tristram Engelhardt, After God: Morality and Bioethics in a Secular Age (New York: St 
Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2017).
6 Tristram Engelhardt, “Christian Bioethics after Christendom: Living in a Secular Fundamental-
ist Polity and Culture”, Christian Bioethics 17, no. 1 (2011): 76.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 20/02/2020 23:22:02 |
[ 52 ]
ANA S. ILTIS ENGELHARDT ON THE COMMON MORALITY IN BIOETHICS 
crafting shared moral principles that could be used to govern human research to 
re-build trust in the research enterprise and avoid future scandals. The National 
Commission settled on three principles: respect for persons, beneficence, and 
justice (National Commission 1979). Its description of these principles was largely 
influenced by influenced by Tom Beauchamp, who had been hired to help with report 
writing, Engelhardt and others who like him who had been asked to write papers for 
the Commission’s consideration, as well as the Commissioners.7 Engelhardt would 
eventually describe the paper he wrote for the National Commission in which he 
advocated for “general principles of moral conduct” (1978) as one of the “sins of 
[his] youth.” 
At the same time that the National Commission was developing a common moral 
framework for human research and articulating its three principles, Tom Beauchamp 
and James Childress were working together on a book that would shape the field 
profoundly. In The Principles of Biomedical Ethics (1979), now in its seventh edition, 
they claimed to have identified some of the common moral principles shared among 
persons who held different particular accounts of morality. This common morality 
included four principles that were especially important in the biomedical setting: 
respect for autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice. For Beauchamp and 
Childress the common morality consists of “the set of moral norms that all morally 
serious persons share.”8 Individuals hold more than the common morality; they 
hold particular moralities and among those particular moralities we see significant 
differences. But for Beauchamp and Childress, the view that there are some basic 
moral commitments shared among “all morally serious persons” is significant, and 
they spend much of The Principles of Biomedical Ethics developing an account of the 
four principles. These principles require specification to yield concrete action-guides, 
and, as prima facie principles, they must be balanced to determine which obligations 
will be honored in cases of conflict. Specification and balancing require substantive 
moral commitments, and herein lies one of the reasons for which the common 
morality cannot deliver as hoped, as discussed below. 
The desire for a common morality is understandable. It would appear to give us 
a basis for making decisions and developing policy in the face of pluralism without 
imposing our own particular moralities on others. The allegedly shared commitments 
of rational agents are seen as an appropriate shared basis for public policy and clinical 
decision making in a morally pluralistic society.
Engelhardt and the (Implausible) Common Morality
Despite his contribution to the common moral language of principles for 
7 Albert Jonsen, The Birth of Bioethics (New York: Oxford University Press1998), 103.
8 Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2009), 3.
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research ethics, Engelhardt noticed that the dream of a common morality that could 
bypass moral pluralism and enable us to draw moral conclusions amidst the loss of 
moral foundations was not plausible. For the principles to be action-guiding, we must 
determine what they mean, what they require, and what they prohibit. This process 
of specification and balancing depends on the moral assumptions or the conceptions 
of the right and the good of the persons in the privileged position to specify and 
balance the principles. For example, to understand what it is to respect the principle 
of justice, we need to know what constitutes justice. In attempting to flesh out that 
content we find numerous, incompatible accounts of justice. Further, we cannot 
resolve some of the differences by establishing which account of justice is based on 
reason alone. All accounts of justice require us to grant certain assumptions, e.g., 
they require a conception of the good or they require that we have some account 
of rights. We cannot specify our way to moral content from nowhere; instead, we 
require a moral starting point, and those starting points can vary dramatically among 
persons. Insofar as we acknowledge this, it is at best trivially true that we share a 
common morality. Thus even if we concur that we should adopt just practices and 
avoid injustice, we might have different conceptions of justice and thus different 
accounts of which policies and practices promote justice and avoid injustice. 
It is for this reason that Engelhardt noted that appeals to mid-level principles 
might resolve controversies “when individuals with the same or very similar moral 
visions or thin theories of the good and justice have reconstructed their moral 
sentiments within divergent theoretical approaches.”9 If people already have the 
same general views about a moral question, such as the permissibility of allowing 
for inequalities in the health care system that allow the rich to access better care 
or to access health care more quickly, then it should come as no surprise that they 
will be able to come to consensus. They might explain their reasons for reaching 
to those shared conclusions differently, such as by an appeal to consequences or 
to deontological right- and wrong-making conditions.10 But because they already 
shared a “moral lifeworld”, their shared conclusions despite different justifications 
are no surprise. From that shared moral lifeworld, “it is not at all amazing that their 
different theoretical apparatuses generally justify similar choices.”11 But the story 
changes when the persons in question occupy different moral lifeworlds. For instance, 
if those who have different background conceptions of justice, such as Rawlsians and 
Nozickians, were to attempt to asses the permissibility of a two-tier system that 
allows the rich to access better care even if this makes the poor worse off, then no 
set of mid-level principles will lead them to the same conclusions.12 Without any 
9 Tristram Engelhardt, The Foundations of Bioethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 
56.
10 Ibid., 57.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
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established way to judge among particular moralities, it is just one among many 
and not, as its proponents say, the morality that binds all morally serious persons. In 
other words, “[t]he appeal to middle-level principles may succeed in bridging the gulf 
between those who share a moral vision, but who are separated by their theoretical 
reconstruction of that vision. But it will not bridge the substantive gulf between 
those separated by different moral visions or different moral senses.”13 The latter 
gulf is real, not imagined, and it is this gulf that explains the culture wars.14 
The common morality as described in the Bioethics literature is not actually held 
in common in any substantive way. It is also not neutral nor is its application neutral in 
the sense of not favoring or undermining any particular account of morality. Consider 
the shift in the Bioethics literature toward allowing children more authority over 
their health care decisions. Many contributors recommend this shift out of respect 
for the (emerging) autonomy of children or because they think that it will promote 
the good by producing better health outcomes. Policy and legal changes that grant 
minors greater legal authority to make their own health care decisions, particularly 
with respect to contraception and abortion, appear to arise from applications of the 
common morality principles of respect for autonomy and beneficence. Often they 
are defended using data that adolescents are able to make decisions comparable to 
those of adults15, or that they lead to better health outcomes because they reduce the 
teen pregnancy rate. To hold that the observation (which has been challenged16) that 
adolescents are approximately as good as adults at making certain kinds of decisions 
already is to assume that the ability to decide justifies granting decision making 
authority or is more important than parental authority. To assume that allowing 
adolescents to make their own decisions advances public health goals and that this 
justifies granting them this authority is to assume that the ends justify the means 
(means which some consider illicit). Alternatively, it is to assume that public health 
officials’ conceptions of the good, which involve contraceptive use and extramarital 
sex, are more important than other conceptions of the good, such as those held 
by traditional religious believers who recognize the authority of parents over their 
children. Policies that appear neutral and are defended using common morality 
principles, such as respect for autonomy or beneficence, rest on assumptions that 
one way of life is better than another and should be privileged.17 Rather than being 
neutral, they are grounded in particular conceptions of the good and a particular 
ranking of goods.18
13 Ibid., 58.
14 Hunter, 1992.
15 E.g., Weithorn and Campbell, 1982; Weithorn, 1983.
16 For a discussion of these challenges, see Partridge, 2010.
17 Ana Iltis, “Toward a Coherent Account of Pediatric Decision Making”, Journal of Medicine 
and Philosophy 35 (2010): 526-552.
18 For further discussion of the role of the family, see Mark Cherry, Sex, Family, and the Culture 
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A Different Common Morality?
The common morality allegedly is shared among all morally serious persons and 
does not privilege any of the many possible religious or non-religious beliefs people 
in a pluralistic society may hold. In this sense it is supposedly neutral, and we can 
rely upon and apply its principles independent of the way of life or conception of the 
good we think is best. It is supposed to give us a way of resolving moral controversies 
when we share space with what Engelhardt calls moral strangers. Because neutral 
reasons must not favor or presume any particular belief or conception of the good, it 
is widely held that secular reasons fit the requirements of neutrality. However, many 
allegedly neutral secular reasons do appeal to particular conceptions of the good 
life and marginalize other such concepts. As Engelhardt and others have shown, and 
as discussed above, the way the common morality has been described and applied in 
Bioethics rests on particular conceptions of morality and favors some ways of life and 
ideologies over others. The problem is not merely that this particular account of the 
common morality in Bioethics is implausible. It is that it is impossible to secure the 
moral guidance necessary to resolve moral controversies from any set of universal 
principles that operate across particular moralities independently of all non-universal 
assumptions about the right and the good. Any allegedly secular neutral account of 
ethics, just like any religious account, will rest on particular conceptions of the right 
and the good and be partial to some ways of life and ideologies. There is no shared 
account of the right and the good. And conceptions of the right and the good are 
essential to resolving moral questions. 
Engelhardt was not alone in describing the implausibility of a common morality. 
For example, Lisa Cahill has argued that there is no “objective, traditionless, secular 
version of philosophical reasoning” by which one may engage public Bioethics.19 
She continues: even the “preeminent and supposedly neutral vocabulary of public 
policy debates in the U.S. today (liberty, autonomy, rights, privacy due process) 
itself comes out of a rather complex but distinct set of political, legal, philosophical, 
moral and even religious traditions.”20 Gilbert Meilaender argues that it is impossible 
to eliminate “from public discourse or debate insights and principles that grow out 
of our deepest religious and normative commitments”, and that “those who profess 
neutrality (or suppose they have ‘set aside’ all metaphysical underpinnings) often 
turn out to be committed to views that can hardly be said to be neutral with respect 
to comprehensive doctrines.”21 Meilaender offers John Rawls’ footnote in Political 
Wars (New York: Routledge, 2016).
19 Lisa Cahill, “Can Theology Have a Role in 'Public' Bioethical Discourse?”, Hastings Center 
Report 20 (1990): 11.
20 Ibid., 11.
21 Gilbert Meilaender, “Against Consensus: Christians and Public Bioethics”, Studies in Christian 
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Liberalism, where although he professes to exclude comprehensive doctrines from 
the discussion of justice, he identifies three values relevant to the permissibility of 
abortion and asserts that “any reasonable balance of these three values will give 
a woman a duly qualified right to decide whether or not to end her pregnancy.”22 
Meilaender demonstrates that Rawls’ “view manages to be simultaneously ad hoc 
and (unwittingly) laden with normative commitments.”23 To hold those values is to 
hold a particular view of the good life. 
The foundational principles of any worldview, including one allegedly based 
on principles disclosed by reason, depend on substantive assumptions. As Kevin W. 
Wildes, S. J. has argued:
“...there are just as many starting points for consideration of secular, 
content-full Bioethics as there are for religious Bioethics, and scholars 
have no way to determine which starting point is correct. Yet without 
some initial set of premises or moral assumptions moral controversies 
cannot be resolved. Content-full assumptions therefore must be made 
if fields of applied ethics, such as Bioethics, are to resolve moral 
controversies. Without any way to know what initial assumptions are 
correct many different ‘Bioethics’ – both secular and religious – will 
result with no way to know which of them is correct.”24
As a result, he argues, no substantive approach to Bioethics or to moral decision 
making in general can be neutral: 
“Every systematic approach to Bioethics – theological, philosophical, 
legal – is particular in some way. Every method needs content... Two 
key points are worth bearing in mind... First, any attempt to address 
moral issues involves choices about some particular method in which 
to frame the issue. The choice of structure represents a particular view 
of moral reason and a way to view the moral world. Second, even if 
there is a common agreement about the method and structure to be 
used, there will still be a need for a content and its specification in 
order to address issues in Bioethics. The field is not simply an argument 
about doing good and avoiding evil but an attempt to argue for which 
evils should be avoided and which goods should be done. Each choice 
Ethics 18 (2005): 79.
22 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 243, n. 32; 
quoted in Gilbert Meilaender, “Against Consensus: Christians and Public Bioethics”, Studies in 
Christian Ethics 18 (2005): 79.
23 Meilaender, “Against Consensus”, 79.
24 Kevin Wildes, “Particularism in Bioethics: Balancing Secular and Religious Concerns”, Mary-
land Law Review 53 (1994): 1221.
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of content represents a particular point of view.”25
and 
“[a]ny content-full philosophical ethics can be said to be particular.”26 
Others have raised similar concerns. For example, Ruth Groehnout has demon-
strated that any approach to Bioethics that will offer substantive directives or evalu-
ation of significant issues cannot be neutral; to do any real work requires, she argues, 
“a fairly rich conception of the good.”27 Moreover, the inability to extract content 
from truly neutral secular reasoning has been demonstrated repeatedly by Engelhar-
dt; even allegedly neutral secular moral and political theories are tradition-bound 
and value-laden.28 Moral content always must be grounded in some view of the right 
or the good. Privileging some grounds (e.g., secular reason shaped by particular phil-
osophical traditions) over others (e.g., Orthodox Jewish insights) ignores the fact 
that all positions share in common epistemic uncertainty – none can be definitively 
defended as the correct starting point for deliberation and all require us to suspend 
particular beliefs. We should not find it surprising that we live in the midst of the 
culture wars because claims to access the morality disclosed by reason alone rely on 
value-laden assumptions.29
The hope of securing a common morality and applying it to Bioethics to resolve 
differences is a fantasy according to Engelhardt and many others. Allegedly neutral 
secular reasons rest on moral presuppositions grounded in particular worldviews, 
including views that require one to explicitly reject other moral positions, accept 
particular conceptions of the good, or recognize the superiority of some ways of life.
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